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The food processing industry is Canada's second-
largest manufacturing industry. It employed 226,579 
people in 1986, and shipments were valued at CDN 
$47 billion, or 15 percent of the value of total 
manufactured output that year. More significantly, 
the food and beverage industries together ranked 
highest among all manufacturing industries in terms 
of value added, at CDN $15 billion or approxi-
mately 14 percent of total value added in Canadian 
manufacturing industries in 1986 (Statistics Can-
ada). Given the high degree of competition in this 
industry in the United States, the history of "com-
fortable" competition in the food industry in Canada, 
and the significant contribution of this industry to the 
Canadian economy, it becomes important to look 
more carefully at how this industry has been and 
will be affected by the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA). 
During the FTA negotiations, several interest 
groups in Canada and the U.S. lobbied hard to be 
exempted from the agreement (Rugman and An-
derson 1987c). Given its strength, both federally 
and provincially, the Canadian agricultural lobby 
succeeded in having marketing boards exempted. In 
so doing, the burden of adjustment to the FTA was 
placed squarely on the shoulders of Canadian-based 
food processors, who now need to either 
rationalize production in Canada or move to the 
U.S. This problem has been aggravated by the size 
asymmetry that characterizes the U.S. and Cana-
dian markets. Although this problem has a bearing 
upon the effects of the FTA upon the Canadian 
food processing industry, the FTA is obviously not 
to be blamed for differences in the size of the Ca-
nadian and U.S. markets. 
This article will focus upon the following sec-
tors: dairy (milk), feathers (chicken, turkey, eggs), 
pork processing, fish processing, and beef and veal 
processing. In 1986, the total numbers of farms in 
Canada were grouped in the census as follows. 
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Cattle and small-grain farms accounted for the 
highest numbers, with 59,000 farms each. Wheat 
ranked second, with 47,000 farms, followed by 
dairy, with 34,000; pigs, with 12,000; and, finally, 
poultry with 5,000 farms. Table 1 examines the 
extent to which Canadian agriculture is involved 
in trade with the U.S. It reports the import and 
export percentages in 1986 as well as the impor-
tance of the U.S. to each major agricultural sector. 
These data do not distinguish between trade of raw 
versus processed products. However, it does in-
dicate Canada's dependence on the U.S. market, 
since nearly 61 percent of the value of Canada's 
exports of agricultural products, excluding grains 
and oilseeds, went to the U.S. over the 1981 to 
1987 period. 
Supply Management and the FTA 
Many of Canada's food industries are highly reg-
ulated by supply-management programs at the farm 
level. The most common mechanisms used are pro-
duction quotas, mandatory pricing, import con-
trols, and restrictions on interprovincial trade. In 
the FTA, supply management and the rest of this 
structure were retained, including import controls 
that keep out potentially cheaper U.S. products. 
Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which permits import controls, 
reinforces this aspect of the FTA but is currently 
being negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Certain 
processed products were not included in the import 
control list, including frozen pizzas and frozen 
chickens. As a result, these products are no longer 
economical to produce in Canada, since U.S.-
produced imports are cheaper. These product lines 
are being lost to U.S. producers. 
In addition, Canadian food processors are being 
forced to purchase more expensive inputs from Ca-
nadian suppliers, leading to severe adjustment costs 
as tariffs are reduced on processed food, leading 
to potential problems for future investment and plant 
location decisions, especially for larger firms. 
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Table 1.    Canada-United States Agricultural Trade, 1986 
 
    Percentage Share of
    Trade by Volume Percentage of Total Exports Going to the U.S.*
Product Traded    Exports          Imports (As a percent of value) 
Animals and products    43.9                17.8   23 (other animal products) to 89 (live animals)  
Grains and products    10.8                 7.1 64 (products) to 3 (grains) 
Animal feeds    4.1                 2.6 49
Vegetables    3.6               16.5 36
Potatoes    2.1                  1.3 49
Fruits and nuts    0.8               24.1 70
Oilseeds and products    3.9                10.7   26 (products) to 7 (oilseeds)   
Other 30.8               20.0 NA
Total    100.0             100.0   60.5
b  
Source: Agriculture Canada, Communications Branch, "The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and Agriculture: An Assessment," 
1988, p. 10. 
a Where two numbers appear, this represents a range since each category contains a variety of crops. 
b Canadian agricultural exports (excluding grains and oilseeds) to the U.S. from 1981 to June 1987 as a percent of total dollar value. 
With grains and oilseeds, this figure drops to 32% in 1986. 
Food, and other multinational enterprises will find it 
more attractive to locate future production in the 
U.S. than in Canada. This is because the U.S. 
market, both for processed foods and for the in-
dustry's inputs, is ten times larger than Canada's, 
leading to greater economies of scale for U.S. pro-
ducers over Canadian producers. Thus, even if U.S. 
dairy and poultry producers receive the same pro-
duction subsidies as Canadian farmers, the larger 
multinational food processors would be more ef-
ficient in the larger U.S. market. If, in practice, 
U.S. subsidies in these agricultural sectors are lower 
than in Canada, then this economic factor is rein-
forced. 
That this is in fact the case was suggested by a 
report released by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Although 
the Canadian federal government disputed the re-
port's estimates of Canadian agricultural subsidi-
zation, its own revised estimates still indicated that 
U.S. subsidies to the agricultural sectors were lower 
than Canada's (Drohan). 
Press reports on plant closures due to the FTA 
reinforce this argument. While much of the media 
coverage listing plant closures due to the FTA is 
superficial and biased (as plant openings are rou-
tinely ignored), some facts can be derived. At least 
five plants appear to have been shut down: St. 
Lawrence Starch Co., Ltd. in Mississauga; Gobi 
Foods in Port Williams, Nova Scotia; Gerber (Can-
ada) International in Toronto; and two Campbell 
Soup plants in Montreal and Portage la Prairie. Of 
these, St. Lawrence Starch closed because of a 
Canadian-imposed countervailing duty on imports 
of fresh grain corn. This has absolutely nothing to 
do with the FTA. In addition, several other plants 
are alleged to have taken action to meet the chal- 
lenge of heightened competition south of the border. 
The most recent news highlighting the attempts 
by the industry to cut costs comes out of H. J. 
Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. in Leavington, Ontario, 
where workers recently voted to accept a wage 
freeze over two years when faced with the real 
possibility of plant closure (Globe and Mail). Other 
companies that have taken measures to cut costs 
include Borden Inc. of Montreal, the Hunt-Wesson 
division of Beatrice Co., Inc. of Chicago, E.D. 
Smith, Cadbury Schweppes Canada, Campbell 
Soup, and Labatt's Ault Foods. 
Several recent reports have confirmed the the-
oretical analysis of this paper. In February 1989 
the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food re-
leased a report of the Food Industry Advisory Com-
mittee on the food industry. It stated that supply-
management policies would make it more difficult 
for food processors to compete under the FTA. The 
report stated that marketing boards serve to stabilize 
producers' income rather than achieve com-
petitiveness. The nature of strategic management 
in multinational enterprises, including the food pro-
cessing industry (especially multinational fish pro-
cessors), has been examined by Rutenberg and by 
Rugman and Verbeke. 
Trade Law Actions against Canadian 
Food Processors 
The Canadian pork industry is not affected directly 
by the FTA. Indeed, it was doing well until the 
rival U.S. industry essentially imposed a prohibi-
tive entry barrier by winning a trade-law action 
against Canadian producers. This countervailing 72    October 1990 
duty goes back to the "live swine and pork" case of 
1985 where the U.S. agencies placed a duty on 
imports of live swine but not on processed pork 
products.  Accordingly, the Canadian industry 
switched more to processing the pork before 
exporting it to the U.S. However, those in the 
U.S. industry kept up their legal harassment of 
Canadian pork exporters, alleging subsidies were 
now going to the Canadian pork processors. In 
1989, the U.S. side won an affirmative ruling 
from both the U.S. International Trade Commission 
and the U.S. Commerce Department against the 
Canadian processors. This has been appealed 
 
to one of the new Chapter 19 binational panels set 
up in the FTA, and its decision will be of great 
interest. For an overview of the comparison of U.S. 
and Canadian unfair trade laws, see Rug-man and 
Porteous (1989). The process by which U.S. trade 
law results in an administrative bias against Canadian 
producers is discussed in Rugman and Anderson 
(1987b). They show that a variety of Canadian 
agricultural and fish products have been harassed 
since the changes in the GATT Subsidies and Anti-
dumping Codes were adopted by the U.S. in 1979. 
Table 2 shows that there were a total of sixteen U.S. 
countervailing duty cases and twenty-two 
antidumping cases over the last ten years against 
Canada. Of these, eight countervailing cases were 
against agricultural and fish products, while there 
were six antidumping agricultural cases. It is 
obvious that Canadian food producers and processors 
could face more trade-law-related actions in the 
future given the high degree of dependence on the 
U.S. market for certain agricultural and fish sectors. 
The softwood lumber industry learned how 
devastating the misuse of U.S. trade laws could be 
when it was forced to adopt a 15 percent export tax as 
settlement on a preliminary countervailing duty case 
decision made in 1986 (Rugman and Porteous 1988), 
The Atlantic fish processing industry had been 
subject to five U.S. countervail actions before the 
FTA. The most significant was the 1986 fresh 
groundfish countervail of 6.2 percent. Many in the 
industry felt that without the FTA, action would be 
taken against exports of frozen fish (the great bulk 
of fish exports to the U.S.). There were two hard 
smoked herring fillet cases, since the first case was 
terminated and then restarted a month later by a new 
claim that the Canadian producers were subsidized. 
For a discussion of the trade-law fish cases, see 
Rugman and Anderson (1987a). The FTA will 
eliminate all tariffs by the end of a ten-year phase-in 
period. For some fish exports of prepared meals (fish 
sticks, etc.), these tariff cuts (of 10 to 25 percent) 
offer significant benefits. 
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Table 2.    U.S. Countervailing Duty and 
Antidumping Duty Cases Against Canada: 
1980-89 
    Positive or 
Year  Products Covered Negative"
Counttervailing Duty Cases   
1980 Frozen potato products Negative
1980 Fish (fresh, chilled, or frozen)  Positive
1981 Hard smoked herring filets  Negative
1981 Hard smoked herring filets  Negative 
1982 Certain rail passenger cars and parts  Positive
1982 Softwoodlumber Negative
1982 Softwood shakes and shingles  Negative
1982 Softwood fence Negative
1984 Live swine and pork Positive
1985 Certain raspberries Positive
1985 Oil country tubular goods  Positive
1985 Certain fresh Atlantic groundfish Positive
1986 Softwood lumber Positive
1986 Certain fresh-cut flowers Positive
1988 Thermo, cntrlld. appl. plugs/probes  Negative
1989 Fresh, chilled, and frozen pork  Positive 
Antidilimping Cases   
1980 Sugars, syrups Positive
1980 Clams in airtight containers  Negative
1980 Asphalt roofing shingles Negative
1981 Sheet piling Positive
1982 Chlorine Negative
1982  Frozen french-fried potatoes  Negative 
1983 Certain fresh potatoes Positive
1983 Choline chloride  Positive 
1984 Certain red raspberries Positive
1984  Certain dried salted codfish  Positive 
1984 Egg filler flats Positive
1985 Rock salt Positive
1985  Welded carbon steel pipes/tubes  Positive 
1985 Iron construction castings Positive
1985 Oilcountrytubular goods Positive
1986  Certain brass sheets and strips  Positive
1986  Certain fresh-cut flowers  Positive
1986 Color picture tubes Positive
1987 Potassium chloride Suspended
1987 Certain line pipes and tubes  Negative
1988 
1988




Source: United States International Trade Commission, Annual 
Reports, 1980-88. 
a A positive case is one found against Canada; a negative case is 
one in favor of Canada. 
On the West Coast, the ruling of the Chapter 18 
panel on the landing of salmon and herring was a 
reasonable decision, reflecting the panel's inde-
pendence on a very political issue. The Canadian 
case for landing salmon and herring for inspection 
was a thinly disguised protectionist device, illegal 
under both the GATT and the FTA. The panel 
found this to be so, but still ruled that 75 percent 
of the fish could be landed for inspection. The 
Canadian government was forced to accept this 
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The FTA was of benefit to beef producers since it 
removed import laws and other restrictions and all 
U.S. tariffs on red meat. This encouraged exports 
of processed high-value-added Canadian meat 
products. We now turn to a more detailed analysis 
of the impact of the FTA on these key food pro-
cessing sectors. 
Effects of the Canada-U.S. FTA on 
Food Processing 
The Canada-U.S. FTA has resulted in a variety of 
changes to the laws governing the import and ex-
port of processed and unprocessed agricultural 
products between Canada and the U.S. In order for a 
thorough examination to be made of the FTA's 
effects on food processing in Canada, we also need 
to examine other indirect effects as well as ex-
emptions and future negotiations that are contained 
in the agreement. Most of the provisions contained 
in the FTA governing agricultural products will 
result in the opening of markets between the two 
countries in the long run. There are, however, a 
variety of provisions that will continue to severely 
restrict the import of agricultural products into Canada 
and exports to the U.S. These provisions will affect 
Canadian food processors. Before examining these 
effects, it is necessary to review the relevant 
chapters and articles contained in the FTA. 
The Direct Provisions of the FTA 
Affecting Agriculture 
The articles governing trade in agricultural prod-
ucts between Canada and the U.S. are contained 
in Chapter 7 of the FTA (Canada 1988a). The first 
of these articles (701) is neutral in its effect on the 
opening or closing of markets, but it does encourage 
a more even playing field by prohibiting the use of 
agricultural export subsidies and by eliminating the 
transportation subsidies previously given on 
shipments of grain to the U.S. under the Canadian 
Western Grain Transportation Act. 
Four of the articles are oriented towards the 
opening of agricultural markets. These include Ar-
ticle 702 (in combination with Article 401), which 
will involve the phased elimination of all tariffs 
over a ten-year period, excluding a twenty-year 
snapback provision on fresh fruits and vegetables 
due to any depressed price conditions, combined 
with declining or constant acreage of the crop under 
cultivation. Article 704 exempts restrictions by 
Canada and the U.S. on imports of beef and veal. 
As well it provides for consultations on third coun- 
tries meat imports that are reexported to either 
Canada or the U.S. Canada has also been excluded 
from any future restrictions on products containing 
10 percent or less sugar under Article 707. Article 
708 will open markets by the gradual elimination 
of technical barriers through continuing negotia-
tions by the two countries on the harmonization of 
their technical regulations on agricultural products. 
Article 705 has the potential to open the markets 
for wheat, barley, and oats, as well as their prod-
ucts, through the elimination of Canadian import 
licenses. This may not occur for a number of years, 
since it requires U.S. grain support levels to be-
come equal to Canadian grain support levels. Even 
then, there is a provision built into the agreement 
to permit the reimposition of import restraints if 
U.S. imports increase significantly. 
Two of the articles either have the potential to 
restrict markets or permit the same conditions to 
continue as were in effect prior to the signing of 
the FTA. The first of these, Article 706, maintains 
U.S. market access to Canada for chickens, tur-
keys, and eggs but only at the traditional average 
levels of actual imports over the five years prior to 
the signing of the FTA. The second of these, Ar-
ticle 710, is probably the most important section 
for restricting the opening of agricultural markets 
between Canada and the U.S. This article main-
tains the restrictive trade practices negotiated under 
GATT Article XI(2)(c) that permit a national gov-
ernment to (1) restrict the quantities of agricultural 
products to be produced or marketed or their sub-
stitutes, (2) remove surpluses of the domestic 
product by restrictions on production or through 
giveaways or price reductions, and (3) restrict 
production of animal products that are directly 
dependent on an imported commodity for their 
production (i.e., reducing import dependence). 
These provisions permit the federal governments 
of Canada and the U.S., as well as the provincial 
and state governments, to control the pricing and 
supply of food products. In the case of Canada, 
this perpetuates the existence of agricultural mar-
keting boards. 
Indirect Provisions of the FTA 
Affecting Agricultural Trade 
As well as the provisions contained in Chapter 7 
of the FTA, there are a number of other provisions 
in the agreement which will also have an effect on 
the food processing sector in Canada. Chapter 8 
contains provisions that relate strictly to the pro-
duction and distribution of wine and spirits in Canada 
and the U.S. In general, the articles contained 74    October 1990  NJARE 
under Chapter 8 will eliminate the pricing differ-
ential between imported and domestic distilled spirits 
immediately and by 1995 for wine. Also, any 
blending requirements of import with domestic 
product will be eliminated by both countries. The 
chapter does, however, permit private wine outlets 
in the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia 
to continue their present levels of discrimination 
against imported products. 
Two of the articles contained in Chapter 12 also 
have some impact on food processing under the 
FTA. The first of these, Article 1203(c), permits 
restrictions to be maintained on the export of un-
processed fish products as contained in the existing 
statutes of New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec. The 
second of these, Article 1204, excludes national 
treatment from applying to products containing beer 
or malt. In effect, Canada, or the provinces in this 
instance, as they are responsible for the regulation 
on products containing alcohol, can continue to 
discriminate against beer or malt products from the 
U.S. Canada is not, however, exempt from pro-
hibitions placed against it through any GATT rul-
ings that find Canadian practices discriminatory 
(including provincial regulations) and therefore 
GATT illegal (Article 1205). 
Dispute-Settlement Provisions in the FTA 
Three other chapters in the FTA are also of im-
portance to the opening up or closing down of trade 
in agricultural products. These are the two dispute-
resolution chapters, Chapters 18 and 19, and the 
emergency-action provisions contained in Chapter 
11. For a more thorough overview of the dispute-
settlement mechanisms in the FTA, see Anderson 
and Rugman (1989a), and for a discussion of the 
extension of net-net to the Canada-U.S. Subsidies 
Code, see Anderson and Rugman (1989b). 
Chapter 18 is responsible for providing the 
institutional structure—the Canada-United States 
Trade Commission—that will manage the agree-
ment as well as settle any trade disputes that arise 
between Canada and the U.S. concerning the in-
terpretation or application of any element of the 
agreement. Chapter 19 is responsible for settling 
trade disputes that pertain strictly to the use of 
antidumping or subsidy-countervailing duties by 
undertaking the final review where the parties dis-
agree, rather than having a federal court in Canada 
or the U.S. do the review. 
Chapter 19 is also responsible for the statutory 
review of any changes to the antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty laws by either country, while under 
Article 1907 it is also responsible for the estab-
lishment of a working group that will develop more 
effective rules and disciplines concerning the use 
of government subsidies, including agricultural ex-
port subsidies that are banned under Article 701. 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate the cases under Chapters 
18 and 19 that have been handled to date. There 
have been a total of eight cases under Chapter 18 
to date. Of these cases, six have been or are con-
cerned with agricultural and fish products. The 
lobster case has already resulted in the restriction 
of sales of small live Canadian lobsters to the U.S. 
There have been twelve Chapter 19 cases to date. 
Four of these cases have been concerned with fish 
or agricultural products. As already mentioned, the 
countervailing duty processed pork case by the U.S. 
against Canada has been appealed to a Chapter 19 
panel for review. A decision on this case is ex-
pected by August 1990. The red raspberries case 
was settled by the panel in Canada's favour, re-
sulting in the overturning of dumping duties against 
British Columbia raspberries exported to the U.S. 
Chapter 11 permits either country to nullify any 
tariff reductions that have taken place with regard 
to the duty reductions negotiated on goods under 
Chapter 4, where surges in imports cause serious 
injury to domestic production. Any increase in duty 
cannot exceed the most favoured nation (MFN) rate 
Table 3.    Chapter 18 Dispute Panels and 
Cases
Dispute Process Used To   
Handle the Case                       Outcome*  Date




Cases initiated by the U.S.:   
1 . Wine and spirits        Not completed  Unknown
2. Plywood                    Not completed  June 1990
3. Cable                        Not completed  July 1990
retransmission  
4. Wool                         Not completed  Unknown 
5. Fruits and                  Not completed  Monitoring
vegetables  




Cases initiated by the U.S.:   
1.S a l m o na n dh e r r i n g P o sitive October 1989
(CDA-01)  
Cases initiated by Canada:   
1 . Lobsters (federal)       Negative  May 1990 
(USA-01)  
2. Lobsters (state)           On hold  Unknown
Source: Binational Secretariate Canadian Section, "Status Report of 
Cases (Chapter 18 and 19)," Ottawa, May 14, 1990; various 
papers, etc. 
a Positive if it favors the initiators) and negative if it 
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Cases  Outcome*  Date 
Cases initiated by the U.S.     
1 . Induction motors  Case dropped  January 1990
(CDA-01)     
Cases initiated by Canada     
1 . Red raspberries  Positive  May 1990
(USA-01)     
2. Paving equipment 1  Negative  January 1990
(USA-02)     
3. Paving equipment 2  Negative  March 1990
(USA-03)
4. Paving equipment 3  Negative  March 1990
(USA-05)     
5. Salted codfish  Case dropped  —
(USA-04)     
6. Fresh, chilled, and  Not completed  November 
frozen pork    1990
(USA-06)     
7. New steel rails  Negative  August 1990
(Sydney Steel)     
(USA-07)     
8. New steel rails  Negative  August 1990
(Algoma Steel)     
(USA-08)     
9. New steel rails Negative August 1990
(USA-09/10)     
10. Fresh, chilled, and  Negative  October 1990
frozen pork (USA-     
ll)
b     
Source: Binational Secretariate Canadian Section, "Status Report 
of Cases (Chapter 18 and 19)," Ottawa, May 14, 1990; 
various papers, etc. (revised October 1990). " Positive if it 
favors the initiators) and negative if it does not. 
b Remanded 
back to ITC by panel which reaffirmed its initial ruling. 
of duty in effect the day of the signing of the FTA, 
or in effect at the time Chapter 1 i is invoked. The 
imposition of restraints can be for no longer than 
three years, and emergency action cannot be in-
voked beyond 1998 when Chapter 11 becomes de-
funct. In terms of agricultural products, Chapter 
11 is extremely important since it eliminates the 
ability of either country to use quotas. Even when 
restrictions are imposed, quantitative restrictions 
cannot be applied below ". . .the trend of imports 
over a reasonable base period with allowance for 
growth (Article 1102(4)(b))." 
A Model of the Effects of the FTA on 
Food Processing 
In order to examine the long-run effects of the 
provisions of the FTA on the Canadian food pro-
cessing industry, the framework outlined in Figure 1 
is used. Three different effects that will occur 
simultaneously are examined: the price effect, the 
trade-protection etiect, and the import-competing 
effect. Two of these effects involve actual trade 
flows—the price and import-competing effects— 
while the trade-protection effect is an institutional 
mechanism that can enhance or reduce the effects 
of the other two. These effects are found on the 
right-hand side of Figure 1 and correspond to the 
"windows" of opportunity of market growth, or 
the loss of opportunity through increased protec-
tionism, indicated by the opening in the "border" 
as permitted by the FTA. 
Table 4.    Chapter 19 Dispute Panels and 
Cases 
The circular nature of the apparent flows of both 
goods and institutional protection, or assistance 
measures to producers and processors, is designed to 
reflect the reality that the provisions contained in 
the FTA have a continuing effect and are not 
one-time shots that adjust the trade flows of agri-
culturally based products between Canada and the 
U.S. This dynamic interpretation is extremely im-
portant since it can dramatically reverse a static 
interpretation of the long-run effects of changes 
brought about due to an FTA provision. We will 
now examine each of the effects. 
The Price Effect 
Prior to the signing of the FTA, the normal distri-
bution, or export channel, for agricultural products 
from Canada to the U.S. was through producers 
supplying Canadian processors with the final products 
being exported across the border. A secondary 
channel was by exporting unprocessed products, 
or products with marginal preparation for pack-
aging purposes, directly to the U.S. for either final 
consumption or further processing. 
Both channels were subject to U.S. tariffs and 
other border measures, some of which have been 
changed by the FTA. These two flows can be seen at 
the top of Figure 1. With the FTA, agricultural 
exports are enhanced over the long term by the 
reduction of duties on agricultural products agreed to 
under Chapter 4. This is further aided by Chapter 11 
of the FTA, which can restrict the imposition of 
duties should the U.S. apply for emergency relief, 
and for certain agricultural products by the 
immediate acceptance of either country's technical 
standards, particularly for beef and veal under Ar-
ticle 704. In the longer run, these standards will 
be harmonized across all agricultural products with 
the negotiations undertaken under Article 708. 
However, with the maintenance of marketing 
boards under Article 710 and the ongoing limita-
tions on imports of chickens, turkeys, and eggs 
under Article 706, there is the possibility that Ca-
nadian food processors could find themselves non-
competitive due to the higher prices imposed by 76    October 1990  NJARE 
 
Figure 1.    Effects of the Canada-U.S. FTA on Food Processing 
these marketing boards. This could lead to the sce-
nario depicted in Figure 1. 
Due to the marketing boards, the export channel 
from food processors in Canada shrinks, or even 
disappears for some types of food processing. If 
the Canadian food processor is producing under 
scale economy conditions (where price is of the 
utmost importance and there is extensive import 
competition, either presently existing or stimulated 
by the FTA), then the higher input costs of mar-
keting boards could well put this type of food pro-
cessor out of business. Only if the Canadian food 
processor is niche oriented and is primarily ser-
vicing the Canadian market, and also faces limited 
price competition from U.S.-based producers, could 
the Canadian firm be expected to survive. 
Canadian producers face a number of possibil-
ities if the scenario outlined above is correct. First, 
those producers already exporting directly to the 
U.S. as input suppliers to U.S. processors in such 
areas as potatoes, fresh fruit, grains, and other un-
processed crop forms may gain if the U.S. pro-
cessors increase their output to supply processed 
food products directly to Canada. This is assuming 
that first they are not already servicing the Canadian 
market, and second that the FTA stimulates them to 
now serve the Canadian market or increase their 
service to the Canadian market if they are presently 
doing so, perhaps due to tariff reductions under 
Chapter 4. If, on the other hand, U.S. marketing 
boards or programs provide the same sort of re-
strictive trade or pricing practices as the Canadian 
boards do, then the market opening generated by 
duty reductions under Chapter 4 will not permit 
the Canadian producers to increase their exports 
directly to the U.S. 
In general, the price effect is a result of internal 
domestic regulations governing agricultural input 
prices. They segment production into either a pre-
dominantly export-oriented food processing sector 
that has to compete on price, or a Canadian-based 
sector selling mainly in the domestic market, but 
facing lower-cost competing products from the U.S. 
This includes substitutes brought about by the low-
ering of customs duties under Chapter 4. The price 
effect applies primarily to economies-of-scale pro-
ducers who are price dependent to sell their product. 
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sell only one or two products across North America, 
will be similarly affected. This could include U.S. 
subsidiaries which have been given North 
American food product mandates. This would occur 
if the majority of their inputs are supplied in 
Canada and the costs of these inputs are priced 
higher than for similar inputs in the U.S. due to 
the control of a marketing board. 
Trade-Protection Effect 
The trade-protection effect consists of three ele-
ments. The first element is the ability of all levels 
of government in Canada and the U.S. to supply 
aid to their agricultural producers and food pro-
cessors. The second is the ability of the FTA to 
nullify government assistance that artificially dis-
torts production or sales of food products in both 
Canada and the U.S. The third element is to what 
extent the FTA restricts or enhances the use of trade 
laws as trade-restricting or protectionist instru-
ments. 
Chapter 19 of the FTA contains institutional pro-
visions under Article 1907 to develop an agreement 
that will control the use of subsidies and other 
government intervention by both Canada and the 
U.S. The government interventions can be seen in 
the middle of Figure 1 and can apply at the pro-
duction, processing, or export stage. Interestingly, 
even though direct export subsidies on agricultural 
products are banned under the FTA (Article 701), 
there are still a variety of programs in both coun-
tries that encourage the export of both processed 
and unprocessed food products. 
The eventual decrease in subsidies should permit 
agricultural prices of inputs to more closely reflect 
the real cost of their production. This will be of 
benefit to some products in Canada that receive 
lower subsidies, or none at all, as compared to 
their counterpart products in the U.S. Conversely, 
for those Canadian products that without subsidies 
are noncompetitive, it could mean a shift for ag-
ricultural producers in Canada away from protected 
crops and also the closure of any Canadian pro-
cessors who were dependent on the artificially lower-
priced input. 
Neither Canada nor the U.S. has been exempted 
from the use of GATT-based Anti-dumping and 
Subsidy-Countervailing Duty Codes in the FTA. 
Therefore, while governments may subsidize, or 
firms price-dump, any artificial benefits received 
that permit the imported product to be favoured 
over the domestically produced one can be reduced 
by the imposition of antidumping or countervailing 
duties. If Canadian producers are primarily affected 
by the price effect and are subsequently reduced 
in number, the level of government support may 
be reduced. Therefore, U.S. agricultural producers 
or processors would have less initiative to invoke 
the unfair trade laws of antidumping and counter-
vailing duty against Canadian food processors. On 
the other hand, Canadian food processors could 
invoke the emergency relief (escape clause) pro-
visions of the FTA against any surges in U.S. im-
ports that are due to the FTA. In any case, whether 
raw products or processed products are imported 
or exported to the U.S. is irrelevant, as they can 
both face punitive actions if they are being dumped 
or subsidized. 
The use of the antidumping and countervailing 
duty trade laws can become anticompetitive and 
result in market closure for both processors and 
producers when they are captured by interest groups 
in either country in order to reduce market com-
petition rather than to genuinely stop the practices 
of subsidization or dumping. (For a more detailed 
explanation, see Rugman and Verbeke.) In this 
case, the increased competition in food processing 
brought about by the reductions in duties under 
Chapter 4 could result in the trade laws being used 
to restrict the sale of Canadian products in the U.S. 
market and vice versa. Canada sought an exemp-
tion from the use of antidumping and countervailing 
duty laws by the U.S. since it believed that U.S. 
"unfair" trade laws were increasingly being used 
by interest groups in the U.S. to restrict trade 
(Rugman and Anderson 1987; Rugman 1986 and 
1988). This situation may not be entirely an Amer-
ican phenomenon but can also occur in Canada 
(Porteous and Rugman 1989). 
While Canada did not obtain this exemption, it 
did gain somewhat by the establishment of the right 
to jointly review the appeals of the decisions of the 
national authorities on dumping and countervailing 
in the U.S. These Chapter 19 panels of the FTA 
are an important gain. The dispute panels set up 
under Chapter 19 to review the decisions consist 
of five members, with either two or three Canadians 
sitting on each panel. Americans can similarly sit 
on the dispute panels where U.S. producers appeal 
the decisions of Canadian antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty cases. In general, if the panels work 
properly, they should help to mitigate any unfair 
use of the trade laws by vested interests in both 
Canada and the U.S. (Anderson and Rugman 1989 
and 1990). At this stage, it is still too early to say 
whether the dispute panels are working. 
Import-Competing Effect 
The import-competing effect can be seen in the 
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to the reduction in the barriers to trade, including 
duties under Chapter 4 and technical-standards bar-
riers under Chapter 7 that have been eliminated 
with the FTA. These reductions in barriers permit 
the increased import of U.S. processed and unpro-
cessed agricultural products to Canada. This effect is 
somewhat mitigated by Canadian controls on raw 
products governed by marketing boards and by the 
special provisions contained in the FTA on chick-
ens, turkeys, and eggs under Chapter 7. This is 
similar to the situation facing some types of Ca-
nadian exports to the U.S. where state governments 
directly restrict imports through their own types of 
market control mechanisms. 
The increased imports of U.S. processed food 
products could have a negative impact on Canadian 
food processors based strictly on overall operating 
costs, regardless of whether there is any govern-
ment assistance provided to the industry or whether 
the inputs are governed by a marketing board(s). 
Large-scale producers in the U.S. will in many 
cases be more efficient and be able to supply lower-
priced products to the final Canadian users. 
An example of a U. S. industry facing both lower 
operating costs as well as an advantage due to lower 
agricultural input costs is given by the frozen pizza 
industry. According to a report done for the Ca-
nadian Dairy Commission, the two largest Cana-
dian frozen pizza manufacturers, McCain Foods 
and Pillsbury Foods, have stated that they will move 
their production facilities to the U.S. unless they 
can purchase their cheese requirements at compet-
itive prices. The report argues that the Canadian 
industry, through investments in capital equip-
ment, can increase the efficiency of the Canadian 
plants, thereby overcoming lower labor costs in the 
U.S. However, it cannot take corrective measures 
to reduce the total ingredient cost of a pizza, which is 
made up of approximately 50 percent mozzarella 
cheese. The only way the industry can be made 
competitive in this regard is by having the govern-
ment adjust the dairy support program or by allowing 
the industry to purchase cheese at competitive 
prices so it can compete on an equal basis with 
imported frozen pizza. 
According to the report, 75 percent of Canada's 
mozzarella cheese production is utilized by the pizza 
industry. Therefore, any loss of Canadian pro-
cessing capability would also have serious impli-
cations for the dairy industry. The report indicated 
that Loblaw Companies Limited has already intro-
duced a new frozen pizza, "Presidents Choice— 
The Decadent," which is imported from the U.S. 
This product, even including shipping costs, is ap-
proximately 5 percent cheaper than a similar Ca-
nadian product. Furthermore, there is the likelihood 
that Loblaw's will increase its line of imported 
pizzas as the tariff decreases. 
The above case is similar to the situation that 
Rugman and D'Cruz advance for Canada's service 
industries. While in many cases services are sup-
plied locally, they often form an input into a larger 
production process that in many cases has to com-
pete internationally. It is little solace for a Canadian 
manufacturer to make parts of the process globally 
competitive if many of the domestic inputs are un-
competitive. According to Rugman and D'Cruz, 
the whole system has to be made internationally 
competitive if the Canadian manufacturers are going to 
succeed. 
The import-competing effect may, however, be 
somewhat mitigated to the extent that cheaper raw 
agricultural products can enter Canada. In this case, 
some Canadian food processors may find them-
selves quite competitive compared to their U.S. 
counterparts. In many cases it will depend on con-
sumer demand elasticities and price elasticities. For 
some types of higher-priced processed food prod-
ucts, taste patterns can still permit market differ-
entiation even if a strict niching strategy is not 
undertaken by Canadian food processors. 
It is also not clear to what degree the marketing 
of products, rather than the consumer pricing de-
cision, influences purchase patterns. It is not ap-
parent that lower-priced processed food products 
will always have a competitive edge due to differ-
ences in taste and perceived quality by differen-
tiating consumers. In this case, each type of food 
processor will have to determine its relative market 
positioning—whether as a low-cost price-driven 
processor, as a niche specialty-product player, or 
even as a combination player exhibiting some of 
the benefits of both a low-cost and niche player. 
In either case, it can be assumed that as barriers 
to trade come down between Canada and the U.S., 
there will be necessary adjustments in certain sectors 
of the Canadian food processing industry based 
strictly on U.S. comparative advantage in those 
processed food products sold in Canada. 
Canadian Internal Adjustments 
In addition to the direct FTA provisions governing 
trade in agriculture between Canada and the U.S. 
and the dispute-settlement procedures that may also 
have an effect on agricultural trade, there are other 
key considerations that must be taken into account. 
One is the decentralized nature of the political pro-
cess in Canada that governs the regulation of ag-
ricultural production and processing in Canada. 
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culture. What one government in Canada does may 
be entirely different than the other provinces or the 
federal government. This can have the effect of 
creating market restrictions within Canada such that 
the FTA will encourage a north-south orientation 
in agricultural trade, permitting U.S. producers or 
processors to target the entire Canadian market with 
adjustments for the individual provinces. 
In many cases, these U.S.-based producers or 
processors already have a distinct market advantage 
due to the larger consumer market areas in the U. S. 
Canadian producers, on the other hand, face re-
strictions on operating east-west at the same time 
they have to contend with smaller consumer market 
areas in Canada. Therefore, while the FTA is en-
couraging a more competitive environment in Can-
ada-U.S. agricultural trade, agricultural market 
practices in Canada are restricting intra-Canadian 
trade. In the long run this noncompetitive market 
environment in Canada could be more detrimental 
to Canadian food processors and producers than 
the changes in the competitive environment that 
are actually due to the FTA. 
In this context, agriculture is a microcosm of 
Canada. The decentralized nature of the Canadian 
federation led to many sectors being exempted from 
the FTA (Rugman and Anderson 1987b). The net 
result of this is simply to postpone economic ad-
justment to a later date, depending upon the sup-
pressed degree of protectionism inherent in the 
exempted sector. In some cases, such as marketing 
boards in agriculture, the postponement was a lot 
shorter than anticipated. Now food processors will 
need to become stronger lobbyists in order to offset 
the protectionist farming lobby. 
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